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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the issue of global warming has received renewed
attention in the worldwide media.' On February 2, 2007, the United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggested that
evidence of a warming trend is "unequivocal," and that human activity
has "very likely" been the driving force in the increased temperatures
over the last fifty years.2 As a result of the renewed focus on global
warming, polar bears were recently added to the endangered species list,
3
and approximately 84% of Americans believe that humans are
contributing to climate change, "with 78% saying we should do
something about it 'right away.' 4 However, despite all of the evidence
of global warming, a significant and influential minority still denies its
existence and attacks the science linking human emissions to increased
world temperature.5 The minority suggests that human emissions of
greenhouse gases have contributed very little to the rise in world
temperatures experienced in recent years.6
Even though the science of global warming is still subject to debate,
the United States has taken steps to recognize its existence. For
example, in Massachusetts v. EPA,8 the Supreme Court ruled that the
Clean Air Act expressly authorized the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to regulate carbon dioxide emissions. 9 The regulation
of carbon dioxide relates to the issue of global warming because carbon
dioxide is the chief contributor to the increase in world temperature.1 l
The Supreme Court holding in Massachusetts v. EPA is significant
to the global warming debate because it is the first time that the United
States Supreme Court has considered global warming and determined
that carbon dioxide emissions are the main contributor to the increase in
1. See Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Says Global
Warming Is 'Unequivocal,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at Al (stating that human activity
is now considered the driving force behind global warming).
2. Id. (citing the findings of the leading international network of climate scientists).
3. Felicity Barringer, Andrew C. Revkin & Ian Austen, Polar Bear Gains
Protection as a Threatened Species, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2008, at Al.
4. Nicole Gelinas, A Carbon Tax Would Be Cleaner, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2007, at
All.
5. See Sharon Begley, The Truth About Denial, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 2007, at 20
(noting the impact of the global warming denial machine and the "scientific uncertainty"
that surrounds the subject).
6. See id. at 23.
7. John D. McKinnon, Politics & Economics: APEC Countries Expected To Pass
Climate Measures, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2007, at A8.
8. U.S. 5 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
9. Id. at 1463.
10. THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING 7 (Dean Edwin Abrahamson ed., Island
Press 1989).
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world temperature. Although there are still questions about whether
carbon dioxide is considered a pollutant, l l the result of this holding
means that the United States will see an increase in climate regulations
and American businesses will be forced to alter their practices to
conform to the new regulations. 12  Additionally, the new regulations
might spawn litigation targeting American corporations if those
corporations breach the climate regulations set by the EPA. 13  The
production of greenhouse gases and the potential liability stemming from
such production is now at the forefront of debate, 14 as corporations try to
shield themselves from future lawsuits.
Even as corporations try to protect against litigation related to
global warming, the directors and officers that manage the business must
protect themselves against potential liability stemming from global
warming. Routinely, corporations and other business entities purchase
what is known as Directors and Officers ("D&O") insurance, which
protects the directors and officers of the company if they are sued in a
business capacity.' 5 Unlike a general liability insurance policy, a D&O
policy does not contain a duty to defend,1 6 but rather, is structured to
unequivocally advance defense costs associated with defending the
directors and officers.17 Although D&O exclusions, if applicable, could
eliminate the duty to advance defense costs, such a duty remains in effect
until the insurers can show definitively that the exclusions apply.19
11. See infra Section III(B) for an analysis of why the Supreme Court holding might
not have resolved the question of whether carbon dioxide is a pollutant.
12. But see Stephen Power & Ian Talley, Administration Releases EPA Report, Then
Repudiates It-Blueprint to Reduce Greenhouse Gases Called Too Costly, WALL ST. J.,
July 12, 2008 at A2 (stating the White House still refuses to regulate greenhouse gases).
13. See JOSEPH P. MONTELEONE, GLOBAL WARMING-WILL THERE BE EXPOSuRES
FOR DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS AND WILL IT BE COVERED 1 (2007),
http://www.tsmp.com/pdf/TSMPGlobalWarmingArticle.pdf (discussing how directors
and officers might face liability as a result of global warming litigation).
14. Although at the present time there is no litigation directly related to global
warming or to a breach of a carbon emissions statute, this Comment presupposes that
such litigation will eventually arise as time progresses.
15. MARTIN O'LEARY, DIRECTORS & OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE DESKBOOK xi
(ABA Publishing 2d ed. 2007).
16. The duty to defend is "[t]he obligation of an insurer to provide an insured with a
legal defense against claims of liability, within the terms of the policy." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 544 (8th ed. 2004). The duty to defend is typical in automobile insurance
policies.
17. O'LEARY, supra note 15, at 99 (noting the advancement provision is common in
current forms of D&O policies).
18. An insurance exclusion is a "provision that excepts certain events or conditions
from coverage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 605 (8th ed. 2004).
19. See generally Daburlos v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, 521 F.2d 18, 24 (3d
Cir. 1975) (the insurer carries the burden of proof in showing the exclusion applies);
Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1466 (W.D. Pa. 1986), affd, 836 F.2d
789 (3d Cir. 1987) (same).
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Given the debate over the existence of global warming, and the
disagreement among scientists over whether or not carbon dioxide
constitutes a "pollutant,, 20 presumably, no exclusion would apply.
Furthermore, because no exclusion limits the duty to advance defense
costs, insurance companies could be forced to cover the costs of
litigation, whether directly or indirectly related to global warming.
21
The increased concern over global warming, combined with a desire
to punish companies whose activities contribute to global warming,
should result in more lawsuits against corporate directors and officers.22
Because a D&O insurance policy is structured to advance defense costs,
rather than create a duty to defend, D&O insurers will likely be forced to
pay for litigation related to global warming. The policies were not
drafted to cover these costs.23 The potential increase in global warming
litigation, coupled with the inability of insurers to escape payment, could
either bankrupt insurers or cause them to drastically alter their premiums.
As a result of these potential effects, businesses across America could
experience an increase in operational expenses. Although great costs
could be imposed on insurance companies, forcing insurers to bear such
costs might be better than the alternative-forcing directors and officers
to fund their own litigation.
This Comment will discuss why the difficulty of determining
whether carbon dioxide is a pollutant creates problems for D&O insurers.
Additionally, this Comment will present an argument that D&O insurers
should advance defense costs for global warming when such lawsuits are
brought against directors and officers. Section II of this Comment will
provide background for this argument by examining the differences
between D&O insurance and other types of insurance. In addition,
Section II will examine judicial interpretation of airborne pollutants, and
the growing threat of global warming litigation. Section III will suggest
how claims against directors and officers for global warming will arise in
the near future and discuss why the best result is a universal
20. See Begley, supra note 5, at 20 (discussing the disagreement on whether carbon
dioxide is a pollutant).
21. See Little, 649 F. Supp. at 1466 (stating that the insurer has the burden of
demonstrating that an exclusion definitely applies).
22. See MONTELEONE, supra note 13, at 2 (discussing how the focus on global
warming could lead to exposure for corporate directors and officers); see also Adam M.
Cole, John C. Ulin, Daniel A. Zariski & Lisa M. Cirando, Insurance Coverage for Global
Warming Liability, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 969 (2007) (discussing global
warming insurance in general liability insurance policies).
23. See In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 354 F. Supp. 2d 455, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(stating the purpose of D&O insurance is to encourage capable men and women to serve
on corporate boards).
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determination that insurance companies have a duty to advance defense
costs under current D&O policies.
II. BACKGROUND
Before discussing why insurance companies should advance
defense costs for global warming, it is important to understand the subtle
differences between a D&O insurance policy and a general liability
insurance policy. Additionally, it is useful to examine judicial
interpretation of policy exclusions as well as previous judicial
interpretation of airborne pollutants. Finally, it is necessary to
understand a brief history of global warming lawsuits in order to
understand why such lawsuits will become more prevalent in the near
future.
A. The History ofD&O Insurance
Lloyd's of London introduced the first D&O policy during the Great
24Depression. However, these policies did not gain widespread
recognition until the 1960s.25 Changes in the interpretation of securities
law during the 1960s created potential liability for directors and officers,
rather than just the companies they managed.26 Insurers responded to
these changes in interpretation by creating special policies known as
D&O insurance, which were designed to shield the directors and officers
of a business from liability.
27
D&O insurance is distinguishable from personal liability insurance.
Insurance companies use personal liability insurance to provide
corporations with insurance for claims against the corporation alleging
bodily injury or property damage to plaintiffs that are injured while on
the premises.28 D&O insurance is not intended to be general corporate
insurance, but instead, is a more specialized form of insurance that
specifically protects directors and officers depending on the terms of the
policy.
29
The increased litigation aimed at directors and officers has caused
D&O insurance to become an important fixture in today's corporate
world.30  Recent media coverage of corporate scandals, such as the
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"corporate kleptocracy '' 31 involving media mogul Lord Conrad Black,32
highlights the steady increase in lawsuits involving directors and
officers.33  When discussing the rationale behind D&O insurance, the
court in In re Worldcom, Incorporated Securities Litigation34 stated,
D&O insurance is not only designed to provide financial security for
the individual insureds, but also plays an important role in corporate
governance in America. Unless directors can rely on the protections
given by D&O policies, good and competent men and women will be
reluctant to serve on corporate boards.35
D&O insurance allows people of different economic status to serve as
corporate board members because insurance companies promise to
defend all directors and officers.36
B. The Basics of a D&O Insurance Policy
The most basic function of D&O insurance is to protect directors
and officers from liability stemming from their corporate positions.37
However, understanding the basic language of a policy is important to
understand how the policies would function in covering global warming
claims.38 D&O policies, as an aggregate, are specifically tailored to
individual insureds, and conditions are altered to reflect bargained
terms. 39  However, despite different provisions in D&O insurance
policies as a whole, similarities exist in each coverage plan.40 The most
important similarity is that D&O policies do not impose a duty to defend
on the insurer, but instead, require the insurer to provide coverage for
31. See Sun-Times Media Group, Inc. v. Royal & Sunalliance Ins. Co. of Canada,
No. 06C-1 1-108 RRC, 2007 WL 1811265, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. June 20, 2007) (stating
the scheme to defraud the company amounted to "corporate kleptocracy").
32. Emily Steel, Ashby Jones, & Douglas Belkin, Press Baron Black Guilty in
Fraud Case-Jury, in a Mixed Verdict, Finds Executives Skimmed Millions From
Hollinger, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2007, at A3.
33. See In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(in early 2001 Worldcom executives engaged in a scheme to manipulate public filings);
Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 379 (D. Del. 2002) (executives
manipulated economic reports in order to raise profits and hide economic troubles).
34. 354 F. Supp. 2d 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (this litigation raised coverage issues
between insurer and insured based on the terms of the D&O policy).
35. Id. at 469.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. O'LEARY, supra note 15, at 1 (discussing common policy terms).
39. Id. (stating coverage can differ depending on policy provisions and the law in the
jurisdiction).
40. Id. (stating certain policy terms are common including the definition of "loss,"
the advancement of defense costs, and other policy exclusions such as the pollution
exclusion).
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defense costs.41 In order to gain a better understanding of a D&O policy
and to illustrate the unique structure of a D&O insurance policy, certain
provisions from typical D&O insurance policies will be discussed below.
1. The Duty to Advance Defense Costs
The most fundamental difference between D&O insurance and other
types of widely recognized insurance, such as a general liability
insurance policy, is that a D&O policy contains a duty to advance
defense costs rather than a specific duty to defend.42 The duty to
advance defense costs means that an insurance company does not
directly control the defense of any action and does not have a right to
decide whether a claim is defensible. Instead, under the duty to advance
defense costs, the insurance company is required to reimburse reasonable
defense costs arising out of a covered claim.43 Accordingly, the duty to
advance defense costs permits the insured to choose the lawyer and
direct the legal strategy taken in the case.
Even though the duty to advance defense costs is markedly different
from a specific duty to defend, many courts equate the duty to pay
defense costs with the duty to defend.44 The reason for equating the two
is that, much like the duty to defend, the duty to advance defense costs is
triggered whenever a claim falls within the terms of the policy. 45 Despite
this similarity, the two duties are distinct.
Additionally, the duty to advance defense costs is distinct from the
duty to indemnify because the duty to advance defense costs is triggered
at the beginning of the case rather than the end.46 Unlike with
indemnification, the duty to advance defense costs does not depend on
the outcome of the case but, rather, is an absolute duty to advance costs
for litigation that falls within the insurance policy terms.47
41. See id. at 99 (the most current form of D&O policies provide for advancement of
defense costs).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 99-100.
44. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
45. Wedtech Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 214, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (duty to
pay defense costs exists whenever a complaint alleges claims covered by the policy); Md.
Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 355 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Il. 1976) (allegations of complaint determine the
duty).
46. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 354 F. Supp. 2d 455, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(with duty to advance costs, insurer must pay defense costs as soon as attorney's fees are
incurred regardless of the final disposition of the case).
47. See In re WorldCom, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 464; see also W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 534
N.E.2d 1066, 1068 (II1. App. Ct. 1989) (duty to defend is broader than duty to indemnify
because the claims do not necessarily need to result in indemnification in order to trigger
the duty to defend).
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Advancement of defense costs is an important term in D&O policies
because advancement provides a defendant with immediate access to
capital, which is necessary to maintain a successful defense.48 A typical
advancement clause reads:
THE INSURER MUST ADVANCE DEFENSE COSTS
PAYMENTS PURSUANT TO THE TERMS HEREIN PRIOR TO
THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF A CLAIM.
49
Because advancement is triggered upon the initiation of a lawsuit, the
costs are paid as they are incurred. Even if the suit is settled at a later
time, D&O insurers would still have to pay certain defense costs incurred
prior to settlement.5 °  The most important distinction between
advancement and the duty to defend is that the duty to advance defense
costs does not provide the insurance company with an opportunity to
become directly involved in the litigation, and most tactical decisions are
left to the defendants themselves rather than the insurance company.
2. Policy Definitions and Exclusions
Despite the fact that the duty to advance defense costs is generally
construed in favor of the insured, D&O insurance does not cover every
lawsuit involving the insured.51 Given the high costs of defense, D&O
insurance providers attempt to limit coverage by (1) defining "loss"
narrowly; and (2) writing exclusions designed to sever the duty to
advance defense costs.
52
Many insurance policies specifically define "loss,, 53 but, in general,
the definition is markedly similar across policies and includes things
48. Brady v. i2 Tech. Inc., No. Civ.A. 1543-N, 2005 WL 3691286, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 14, 2005); see also Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005)
("Advancement provides corporate officials with immediate interim relief from the
personal out-of-pocket financial burden of paying the significant on-going expenses
inevitably involved with investigations and legal proceedings.").
49. In re Worldcom, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
50. See In re WorldCom, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (insurer must pay defense costs as
soon as attorney's fees are incurred regardless of the final disposition of the case).
51. See, e.g., Rice v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 113 F. App'x 116, 121 (6th Cir.
2004) (coverage was precluded because a dishonesty exclusion applied); Am. Cas. Co. of
Reading, PA v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 633, 642 (6th Cir. 1994) (regulatory exclusion barred
coverage).
52. See, e.g., Rice, 113 F. App'x at 121 (discussing a dishonesty exclusion); Nat'l
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. U.S. Liquids, Inc., 88 F. App'x 725, 726 (5th Cir.
2004) (per curiam) (discussing a pollution exclusion); Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v.
Conner, 973 F.2d 1236, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1992) (discussing an insured v. insured
exclusion and a regulatory exclusion).
53. See O'LEARY, supra note 15, at 3 (discussing typical loss provisions).
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such as settlements, judgments, and defense costs.5 4  By specifically
defining loss, insurers can limit the coverage of the policy.
Additionally, D&O policies dictate when the insurance company
does not need to reimburse defense costs by including numerous
exclusions.55  The most common exclusions are personal injury
exclusions, personal conduct exclusions, insured v. insured exclusions,
and pollution exclusions.56 Because global warming is most likely
caused by emissions of greenhouses gases,57 the pollution exclusion must
be examined in great detail. Although there is no standard exclusion, the
following pollution exclusion appeared in a 2004 case:
(I) alleging, arising out of, based upon, attributable to, or in way
involving, directly or indirectly:
(1) the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal,
release orescape of pollutants; or
(2) any direction or request to test for, monitor, clean up,
remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants,
including but not limited to a Claim alleging damage to the
Company or its securities holders.
Pollutants include (but are not limited to) any solid, liquid,
gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke,
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste
includes (but is not limited to) materials to be recycled,
reconditioned or reclaimed. '8
This exclusion is relatively broad and does not specifically mention
carbon dioxide. Arguably, carbon dioxide could fit in the category of
any "irritant or contaminant;" however, the exclusion, as written, is still
unduly broad and could raise issues in future litigation. 59 The exclusion
above ultimately raises two important issues that will be discussed in
detail infra Section III: (1) whether, given the definition of pollutant,
carbon dioxide qualifies as a pollutant; and (2) whether the exclusion, as
written, protects insurance companies from paying defense costs
54. See Sun-Times Media Group, Inc. v. Royal & Sunalliance Ins. Co. of Canada,
No. 06C-1 1-108 RRC, 2007 WL 1811265, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 20, 2007).
55. O'LEARY, supra note 15, at 4-6.
56. Id.
57. See THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 10, at 7.
58. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. U.S. Liquids, Inc., 88 F. App'x 725,
726 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); see also CHUBB INSURANCE, EXECUTIVE PROTECTION
POLICY 4 (2008) http://www.chubb.comibusinesses/csi/chubb3080.pdf. (discussing a
D&O policy offered by Chubb Insurance).
59. See infra Section III.
2008]
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associated with global warming. The plain meaning of the exclusion
indicates that if carbon gas is not a pollutant, the exclusion, as worded,
will not apply. Therefore, D&O insurers could be left funding claims
indirectly related to the greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide.
C. Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Terms
In discussing the exclusions of a typical D&O policy, it is important
to examine judicial interpretations of such exclusions. The judicial
interpretation determines how the exclusions relate to real situations as
well as how certain ambiguous exclusions affect the interpretation of the
policy as a whole. Additionally, examining judicial interpretations of
airborne pollutants in a general liability insurance policy is useful
because courts might rely on these opinions in crafting decisions about
D&O insurance.
1. Interpreting D&O Policies
Examining judicial interpretation of D&O insurance policies shows
that courts broadly interpret the duty to advance defense costs. 60 Many
courts even equate the duty to advance defense costs with the duty to
defend, found in other types of insurance policies. 6' As with the duty to
defend, courts hold that the duty to advance defense costs arises when
the allegations of a complaint fall within the language of the policy.
62
Therefore, if any claim falls within the definition of "loss," as defined in
the policy, the duty to advance defense costs arises, and the insurer will
begin to advance defense costs as these costs accrue.63
Despite the duty to advance defense costs, sometimes a complaint
will allege events covered by an exclusion.64 Occasionally, the events
60. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., v. Adams County, 534 N.E.2d 1066, 1068 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989). The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. The duty to defend
arises when the complaint alleges claims that fall within the policy. The claims do not
necessarily need to result in indemnification in order to trigger the duty to defend.
61. Shapiro v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 616 F. Supp. 906, 913 (D. Mass. 1985)
(duty to reimburse defense costs is at least as broad as the duty to defend under traditional
liability insurance provisions).
62. See Wedtech Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 214, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see
also Md. Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 355 N.E.2d 24, 28 (I11. 1976) (allegations of the complaint
determine duty to defend); W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 534 N.E.2d at 1068 (duty to defend arises
whenever allegations in the complaint are potentially covered).
63. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 354 F. Supp. 2d 455, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(insurer must pay defense costs as soon as attorney's fees are incurred regardless of the
final disposition of the case).
64. See, e.g., Rice v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 113 F. App'x 116, 121 (6th Cir.
2004) (coverage was precluded because a dishonesty exclusion applied); Am. Cas. Co. of
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giving rise to the application of the exclusion are clear, such as in cases
of corporate fraud, illegal chemical dumping, and other deceptive
activities.65 However, the more difficult cases addressed by courts
involve events that do not clearly trigger an exclusion and, therefore,
must be litigated by the insurer and the insured to determine whether the
insurer must advance defense costs. 6 6 These situations can arise in either
of two ways: (1) the facts might not be clearly defined at the time of the
dispute, such that the court cannot conclude that an exclusion will
definitely apply to a given circumstance,67 or (2) the language of the
policy itself might be ambiguous as to whether a certain substance would
qualify as an excluded substance under the policy.
68
When the facts are not clearly defined at the start of the litigation,
courts are generally consistent in holding that insurers must advance
defense costs until one of the exclusions definitely applies to the
69situation. In these cases, the burden is on the insurer to definitively
establish that an exclusion applies to the circumstances in dispute.7°
Therefore, where an insurer cannot show that an exclusion definitely
applies, courts adopt a "wait and see" approach, such that the court will
order advancement of defense costs until it can be determined whether an
exclusion should have applied.7' Overall, because insurers can recover
the defense costs from the insured at a later time, if the insurer can
Reading, PA v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 633, 642 (6th Cir. 1994) (regulatory exclusion barred
coverage).
65. See, e.g., Rice, 113 F. App'x at 121 (coverage was precluded because a
dishonesty exclusion applied); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. U.S. Liquids,
Inc., 88 F. App'x 725, 726 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (insurer was not required to
defend its insured because the facts alleged in the complaint triggered the pollution
exclusion).
66. See Stratton v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 03-CV-12018-RGS,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17613, at *15 (D. Mass. Sept. 3, 2004) (attempting to discern
whether use of the word "successor" created underlying ambiguity in the policy); Alstrin
v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 389 (D. Del. 2002) (attempting to
resolve underlying ambiguity in an insurance policy).
67. Sun-Times Media Group, Inc. v. Royal & Sunalliance Ins. Co. of Canada, No.
06C-1 1-108 RRC, 2007 WL 1811265, at *12 (Del. Super. Ct. June 20, 2007) (adopting a
"wait and see" approach in determining whether an exclusion would ever apply).
68. See Stratton, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17613, at *15; Alstrin, 179 F. Supp. 2d at
389.
69. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Sun-Times Media, 2007 WL 1811265, at *12 ("Even if it were shown at a later time that
the exclusions apply, this still does not prevent the advancement of defense costs at the
present time ... ").
70. See Shapiro v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 616 F. Supp. 906, 913 (D. Mass.
1985) (insurers' duty to show the policy does not cover the claim); Int'l Paper Co. v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., 320 N.E.2d 619, 621 (N.Y. 1974) (same).
71. Sun-Times Media, 2007 WL 1811265, at *12.
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ultimately show the exclusion will apply to the events at issue, courts
award defense costs when it is unclear whether an exclusion applies."
Even more problematic for courts is the situation where the policy
itself contains ambiguous terms.73 In the case of pollution exclusions,
courts deal with whether or not certain substances are excluded under a
policy. 74  While courts generally hold that any ambiguity is resolved
against the drafting party,75 the circuit courts have split over what exactly
constitutes an "ambiguous" term. 76  Because an insurance contract is
governed by basic contract law, interpretation of certain terms depends
on whether the court is willing to allow extrinsic evidence.77 While some
courts are willing to look beyond the plain language of the policy in
order to discern the intent of the parties in drafting the exclusion,78 other
courts simply look at the language in the policy without examining any
extrinsic evidence.79  A refusal to admit extrinsic evidence can be
particularly harsh for insurers because even one ambiguous term in the
exclusion can result in the inapplicability of the exclusion and force an
72. Id. (if it is later found that insured was not entitled to defense costs, insurer can
recoup that money). But see O'LEARY, supra note 15, at 110 (recoupment of defense
costs not allowed unless specifically provided in the policy).
73. See, e.g., Stratton, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17613, at *15 (attempting to discern
whether use of the word "successor" created underlying ambiguity in the policy); Alstrin,
179 F. Supp. 2d at 389 (attempting to resolve underlying ambiguity in an insurance
policy).
74. Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No.
3.95 CV 7700, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24255, at *18-19 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 1997)
(discussing whether asbestos was a pollutant).
75. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. U.S. Liquids, Inc., 88 F. App'x
725, 728 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (if court finds an ambiguity, court should construe
the policy strictly against insurer); Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 795 F.2d 1450, 1454
(9th Cir. 1986) (ambiguous language in D&O policy must be resolved in favor of insured
under Hawaiian law); In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 354 F. Supp. 2d 455, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (when ambiguity exists that cannot be resolved by extrinsic evidence,
such ambiguity is read against the insurer); Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp.
1460, 1463 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987) (Pennsylvania law
construes an ambiguous provision against drafting party).
76. See Okada, 795 F.2d at 1454 (finding ambiguity in D&O policy because the
policy did not state what claims it was intended to cover). Compare with PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 659-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (D&O policy unambiguously
obligated insurer to pay defense costs as they were incurred).
77. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Duplan Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1112, 1122
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing whether to allow extrinsic evidence and holding that
extrinsic evidence was disallowed).
78. See In re Worldcom, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (seemingly willing to consider
extrinsic evidence); Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Zandstra, 756 F. Supp. 429, 431 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (noting the purpose behind a certain "insured v. insured" exclusion was to
prevent collusive lawsuits).
79. Daburlos v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, 521 F.2d 18, 26 (3d Cir. 1975)
(disallowing extrinsic evidence to show intent in an insurance case).
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advancement of defense costs.80 Even in jurisdictions allowing extrinsic
evidence, a problem may still arise with future interpretations of the
pollution exclusions in a D&O policy if there is not enough evidence to
show that the pollution exclusion was intended to include greenhouse
gases. Science experts disagree as to whether greenhouse gases
constitute pollution,8 l and it is likely that courts interpreting the term
"pollution" contained in many D&O insurance policies will reach a
similar split.
2. Interpretation of Airborne Pollutants in General Liability
Insurance
Although courts have yet to examine whether carbon dioxide is a
pollutant in a D&O context, courts might look to similar language in a
general liability insurance policy in order to guide their determination.
An examination of whether carbon dioxide is considered a pollutant
under a general insurance policy might help a court determine whether
the same logic should apply in a D&O context. However, even an
examination of general insurance policies is problematic. In the general
insurance context, the circuit courts have split over whether certain
airborne pollutants, similar in chemical structure to carbon dioxide, are in
fact pollutants.8 2 Although few cases directly consider carbon dioxide,
an examination of the courts' treatment of other airborne chemicals, such
as carbon monoxide, shows just how much difficulty courts have had in
defining "pollutant."
8 3
Some courts have interpreted the pollution exclusion in a general
liability insurance policy broadly in favor of the insurer. In
80. See Employers Ins. of Wausau, 899 F. Supp. at 1122 (resolving ambiguity of
policy terms against insurer and ordering a large advancement of defense costs).
81. Begley, supra note 5, at 20.
82. Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
carbon monoxide was a pollutant and therefore the pollution exclusion applied);
Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 1047 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (holding
that carbon monoxide was a pollutant that fell within the pollution exclusion); see also
Essex Ins. Co. v. Tri-Town Corp., 863 F. Supp. 38 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding that carbon
monoxide falls within the pollution exclusion). But see Reg'l Bank of Col., N.A. v. St.
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 35 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding carbon monoxide
was not a pollutant covered by the exclusion); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms 687 N.E.2d
72 (Ill. 1997) (holding carbon monoxide was not a pollutant covered by the pollution
exclusion); Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 728 (Wis. 1997)
(holding carbon dioxide was a natural product of respiration and not covered by the
pollution exclusion).
83. Compare Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 648 A.2d at 1047 (holding that
carbon monoxide was a pollutant that fell within the pollution exclusion), with Reg'l
Bank of Col., N.A. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 35 F.3d at 494 (holding carbon
monoxide was not a pollutant covered by the exclusion).
2008]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil,84 after hotel guests suffered from
carbon monoxide poisoning, the Fourth Circuit determined carbon
monoxide was a pollutant.85 The incident arose out of an accident at a
Holiday Inn in Florida. 86  Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A issued the
insurance policy, which contained an absolute pollution exclusion that
defined pollutants as "smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, sounds,
alkalies, chemicals, liquids, solids, gases, thermal pollutants and all other
,,87irritants or contaminations. Additionally, the clause excluded "the
contamination of any environment by pollutants that are introduced at
any time, anywhere, in any way.' 88  The court reasoned that the
definition of pollution was very broad and naturally encompassed carbon
monoxide because it was either a "fume," a "vapor" or a "gas," as
defined by the exclusion.8 9  The court also held that the absolute
pollution exclusion was unambiguous as it was stated in the policy.
90
Similarly, in Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company,91 the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that carbon monoxide was a
substance that fell within the total pollution exclusion of the insurance
policy. 92 The court first examined the policy and attempted to determine
whether the language of the policy was ambiguous.93 The court stated,
Language can be regarded as ambiguous in two different respects:
(1) it may be intrinsically unclear, in the sense that a person reading it
without the benefit of some extrinsic knowledge simply cannot
determine what it means; or (2) its intrinsic meaning may be fairly
clear, but its application to a particular object or circumstance may be
uncertain.94
In applying this test, the court determined that the absolute pollution
exclusion was clear and unambiguous, and therefore, coverage for
carbon monoxide was precluded.
95
Although neither Assicurazioni Generali nor Bernhardt discussed
carbon dioxide, these cases and others96 interpret gaseous substances as
84. 160 F.3d at 997.
85. Id. at 1006.
86. Id. at 999.
87. Id. at 999-1000.
88. Id. at 1000 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 1006.
90. Id. at 999.
91. 648 A.2d 1047 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
92. Id. at 1052.
93. Id. at 1051.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1052.
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pollutants excluded by the pollution exclusion. Using the rationale
developed in these cases, future courts could also interpret carbon
dioxide to be a gas or chemical irritant that would be excluded under the
policy.97  However, despite the persuasive logic of holding certain
airborne pollutants excluded under the policy, there is a split in authority
in determining which gaseous substances constitute "pollutants." 98
Contrary to the holdings in the above cases, in Regional Bank of
Colorado, N.A. v. St. Paul Fair and Marine Insurance Company,99 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that
carbon monoxide was not a pollutant excluded under the policy.0 ° In
that case, pollutants were defined as "smoke, vapors, soot, fumes; acids,
alkalis, chemicals; and waste."' 01  Much like in Bernhardt, the court
examined the language of the policy to determine ambiguity and
attempted to define the words in accordance with what an ordinary
policyholder might determine the words to mean.
0 2
Although the court did not directly address whether the policy was
in fact ambiguous, the court stated that it would reach the same result
regardless. 10 3 The court conceded that a person of reasonable intellect
might consider carbon monoxide a pollutant, but it reasoned that an
ordinary policyholder would not reasonably characterize carbon
monoxide emitted from a faulty heater as "pollution."' 4 The court also
rejected the argument that carbon monoxide was an irritant, reasoning
that if irritant included carbon monoxide, the definition of irritant would
be virtually boundless.'0 5 The court determined that the term pollutant
should be confined to substances generally thought of as pollutants. 106
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Illinois in American States
Insurance Company v. Koloms' °7 held that carbon monoxide was not a
pollutant within the meaning of the exclusion.'0 8  In this case, the
96. See Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997 (4th Cir. 1998); Essex
Ins. Co. v. Tri-Town Corp., 863 F. Supp. 38 (D. Mass. 1994); Bernhardt, 648 A.2d at
1047.
97. See Cole et al., supra note 22 (discussing interpretation of insurance policy terms
in general liability insurance).
98. Compare Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 648 A.2d at 1047, with Reg'l
Bank of Col., N.A. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 35 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 1994).
99. 35 F.3d at 494.
100. Id. at 498.
101. Id. at 496.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 497.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 497-98.
107. 687 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1997).
108. Id- at 82.
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employees of a commercial building brought suit against the owners of
the property, alleging fumes emitted by a defective furnace caused them
injury. 10 9 Once again, the issue was before the court because the owners
of the property wanted the insurer to reimburse their costs. The subject
of litigation was the meaning of the term "pollutants."" 0 In rejecting the
notion that carbon monoxide was a pollutant, the court determined that
the claims did not involve a hazard traditionally associated with
environmental pollution. 1 ' The court stated that the accidental release of
carbon monoxide is beyond the scope of environmental pollution
covered by the clause.'
1 2
Finally, in Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Incorporated," H3 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the grant of summary judgment
and determined that carbon dioxide was not a pollutant under the
pollution exclusion. 1 4 The court refused to place a natural product of
respiration in the same class as "smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, alkalis,
chemicals and waste" defined in the policy. 15  Furthermore, after
considering the exclusion as a whole, the court determined that the
insurance company's definition was ambiguous. 1 6 The court concluded
its analysis by stating that, even if intent were examined, the reasonable
insured would not understand that the pollution exclusion would deny
coverage for something as natural and universally present as carbon
dioxide. "7
Given the split over airborne pollutants in a general liability policy,
such a split might occur if a similar issue were presented in the D&O
context. Section III will examine how the circuit split in the general
liability context could produce even greater, and more pronounced
problems for D&O insurers.
D. Background of Global Warming Litigation
Although global warming litigation has not yet affected directors
and officers directly," l8 an increasing number of cases have alleged
109. Id. at 74.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 81.
112. Id. at82.
113. 564 N.W.2d 728 (Wis. 1997).
114. Id. at 733.
115. Id. at 732-33.
116. Id. at 733.
117. Id. at 732.
118. See MONTELEONE, supra note 13, at 3 (examining current trends and stating how
eventually directors and officers might be linked to global warming).
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damages based on global warming.11 9 Additionally, the growing number
of claims against businesses based on contribution to global warming
indicates that directors and officers might be targets in the near future.12
0
In order to examine just how directors and officers might become
involved in such global warming cases, one must understand how courts
have dealt with other cases involving global warming.
The proliferation of global warming claims is highlighted by Comer
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company.1 21 In Comer, the plaintiffs
wanted the court to certify a defendant class composed of three chemical
companies. 122  These companies had allegedly damaged plaintiffs'
property by emitting greenhouse gases that contributed to global
warming. 123 The plaintiffs demanded that the various chemical and oil
companies be held accountable for contributing to global warming that
exacerbated the strength of Hurricane Katrina.124 Perhaps indicating a
growing trend in global warming litigation, the court allowed the
certification of the class action. 25  However, the judge cautioned
plaintiffs as to the difficultly in proving the case and noted potential
evidentiary problems as well as the sharp difference of opinion in the
scientific community concerning the causes of global warming. 1
26
Comer indicates a willingness by courts to allow parties to proceed
with claims directly related to global warming. 127 While the judge noted
difficulties in proof and the ambiguity of any claim based on alleged
contribution to global warming, the case was allowed to proceed.
28
Comer highlights potential problems for other companies whose actions
might contribute to global warming. 129  By allowing such a case to
proceed, the Comer court opened the door to actions directly related to
global warming.
30
Much like Comer, Friends of the Earth, Incorporated v.
Mosbacher131 arose out of plaintiffs' desire to combat the effects of
119. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007);
Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No 1:05CV436 LTS-RHW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33123 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2006); see also Cole et al., supra note 22.
120. See MONTELEONE, supra note 13, at 3.
121. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33123.
122. Id. at *5.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *12.
126. Id. (stating the difficulty of proving by a preponderance of the evidence how





131. 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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global warming. In this case, the plaintiffs sued defendants for
contributing financial aid to projects that allegedly contributed to global
warming. 133 The California District Court noted the effects of global
warming and the increased public awareness concerning climate
change. 34 Although the court appeared skeptical about claims relating to
global warming, the court eventually allowed the plaintiffs to proceed
with part of the claim. 135 Once again, the court's willingness to entertain
such a claim illustrates that cases relating to global warming will become
more prevalent in the near future.
Perhaps the most noteworthy case discussing the implications of
global warming is Massachusetts v. EPA. 136 In this case, Massachusetts
challenged the EPA's authority to regulate, as prescribed by the Clean
Air Act, the emissions of greenhouse gases. 137 Prior to the lawsuit, the
EPA had declined to regulate greenhouse gases because it believed that
regulation was unwise and not mandated by the Clean Air Act.1
38
Massachusetts, along with other states, challenged the EPA, alleging that
the Clean Air Act mandated EPA regulation of greenhouse gases. 139
The Supreme Court began its analysis by calling climate change
"the most pressing environmental challenge of our time." 140 The Court
also noted that a causal link between greenhouse gases and global
warming has never been firmly established.' 41 However, even with the
ambiguity surrounding global warming and its causes, the Court focused
its attention on the statutory construction of the Clean Air Act to
determine whether the EPA was required to regulate emissions of
greenhouse gases. 142
In a 5-4 decision, the majority held that carbon dioxide was a
pollutant as defined by the statute. 143 In interpreting the statute to define
carbon dioxide as a pollutant, the Court considered the sweeping
definition of "air pollutant" that included "any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents. . . which is emitted into or otherwise enters
the ambient air.', 144  The Court determined that the definition was
132. Id. at 891.
133. Id. at 892.
134. Id. (examining the increase of scientific studies examining global warming).
135. Id. at 891 (Defendants' cross motion for summary judgment was granted in part
and denied in part).
136. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
137. Id. at 1447.
138. Id. at 1450.
139. Id. at 1446.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1451.
142. Id. at 1447.
143. Id. at 1463.
144. Id. at 1460 (emphasis in original).
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designed to be overly broad, as shown by the repeated use of the word
44 ,14 Courtany. ' 5 The Court declared that the statute was "unambiguous.' 46
Even though the majority concluded the statute was unambiguous,
not all members of the Court agreed. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting
opinion in which he criticized the majority's characterization of carbon
dioxide. 147 Scalia highlighted the fact that no link between the buildup of
greenhouse gases and the current climate change has ever been
established. 148  Scalia noted the complexity and evolving nature of
climate change theory and stated that only future study could eliminate
uncertainty and give guidance as to the best way to combat global
warming. 149 Additionally, Scalia commented that carbon dioxide is a
naturally occurring substance throughout the world's atmosphere. 5 ° He
stated that regulation of a naturally occurring substance "is not akin to
regulating the concentration of some substance that is polluting the
air."
151
Not only did Scalia criticize the scientific studies attempting to link
greenhouse gases to global warming, but he also noted how the definition
of air pollutants might not encompass greenhouse gases. 52 Scalia agreed
with the EPA's characterization of carbon dioxide, which was that
carbon dioxide did not merit regulation, and stated that the definition of
"air pollutant" must be viewed in its entirety.1 53 According to Scalia, in
order to qualify as an "air pollutant," the substance should also qualify as
an "air pollution agent.' 154 Scalia also warned that the majority opinion
implicitly held "that everything airborne, from Frisbees to flatulence,
qualifies as an 'air pollutant. "1
55
The importance of Massachusetts v. EPA cannot be understated.
Not only is it the first time the Supreme Court has considered the issue of
global warming and greenhouse gases, but it is also an illustration of the
ambiguities surrounding global warming. 156 Even though the majority
holding appears to resolve the question of whether carbon dioxide is a
pollutant under the Clean Air Act, the question remains as to whether the
holding is limited to the Clean Air Act, or whether it also covers other
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1474 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1477.
151. Id. (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 1475-76.
153. Id. at 1476.
154. Id. at 1476.
155. Id. at 1476 n.2 (emphasis in original).
156. Id. at 1474.
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pollution-related issues, such as the pollution exclusions in a D&O
insurance policy. 157  The inability to answer this question presents
difficult challenges for companies offering D&O insurance policies. 
58
III. ANALYSIS
With the rapid increase of "global warming litigation," there is a
possibility that actions alleging contribution to global warming will be
levied at directors and officers of publicly traded companies. 159 This
section will offer an illustration of how directors and officers might
become involved in global warming litigation and examine why the
ambiguity surrounding carbon dioxide presents problems in determining
insurance coverage. Section III(B) will discuss why the current circuit
split in general liability insurance is likely to carry over to D&O
insurance, and Section III(C) will discuss why this potential circuit split
regarding coverage would be particularly troublesome for insurance
providers in a D&O insurance context. Finally, Section III(D) will
examine how a court should attack the problem and conclude that the
most equitable result would be for the court to find that the insurer must
advance defense costs for directors and officers in global warming
litigation.
A. Illustrating the Problem
It was not long ago that liability for global warming was
unthinkable. 160  However, increased litigation spawned by global
warming means claims against directors and officers are now a very real
possibility.'16  These global warming actions could potentially take two
forms: (1) a class action lawsuit; and (2) a shareholder derivative action.
As discussed in Comer, it is possible that a class action will be
brought alleging that a corporation's actions contributed to global
warming. 162 Instead of suing the corporation, plaintiffs could sue the
directors and officers managing the business. Directors and officers
would be targets because, by increasing productivity at automotive
157. See Cole et al., supra note 22, at 970 (discussing how the majority holding in
Massachusetts v. EPA does not resolve whether carbon dioxide is a pollutant under a
general liability insurance policy).
158. See infra Section III.
159. See MONTELEONE, supra note 13, at 3.
160. Id. at 2.
161. Id.; see also Cole et al., supra note 22 (discussing the necessity of general
liability insurance for global warming cases).
162. Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No 1:05CV436 LTS-RHW, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33123, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2006).
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plants, oil refineries, and other chemical companies, they might face
liability for decisions placing productivity over environmental protection.
Although the class action approach is a possibility, the future most
likely involves shareholder derivative actions 163 alleging that corporate
directors and officers flouted regulations of carbon dioxide.' 64  In
addition to claims for breach of carbon emission statutes, conscientious
shareholders might seek to bring actions against directors and officers in
order to decrease the output of carbon dioxide. These shareholders might
allege that directors and officers failed to use due care 165 in properly
managing the business. 1
66
1. A Hypothetical Claim
In order to demonstrate what the future holds for corporate directors
and officers, a brief hypothetical will be used to illustrate potential
liability for global warming claims. This hypothetical will also
demonstrate how D&O insurers would enter the lawsuit and pay defense
costs and settlement fees for actions directly related to global warming.
With the majority holding in Massachusetts v. EPA, the future will
see a proliferation of carbon emissions statutes designed to reduce levels
of greenhouse gases, most notably carbon dioxide. 167 Presumably, the
passage of such measures would increase the number of shareholder
derivative actions. 168 An increase would occur because now shareholders
could allege a breach of the fiduciary duty of care for failure to abide by
the government mandated provisions and for failure to invest more in
technologies to curb carbon emissions.
169
Additionally, the derivative action form and the class action form
could "double up," meaning that one action could directly result in more
163. A shareholder derivative action is "a suit asserted by a shareholder on the
corporation's behalf against a third party (usu. a corporate officer) because of the
corporation's failure to take some action against the third party." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 475 (8th ed. 2004).
164. See MONTELEONE, supra note 13, at 4 (discussing the possibility of derivative
actions in cases involving global warming); see also O'LEARY, supra note 15, at xi
(discussing the increasing difficulty of resolving derivative lawsuits).
165. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 53 (Del. 2006)
(discussing the duty of care and concluding directors have a duty to not act in a negligent
way when managing the company).
166. See MONTELEONE, supra note 13, at 4 (examining how shareholders might bring
an action against directors and officers for flouting regulatory guidelines, failing to invest
more in energy-friendly technology, and losing favorable settlement opportunities).
167. See id.
168. See id. (discussing how shareholders would have standing to assert derivative
actions).
169. See id. (discussing how an action could be brought for flouting a regulatory
guideline).
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claims. Assume, for example, that a class action is brought for
"contribution to global warming." The impact of this class action could
directly affect the shareholders because a company might not be willing
to settle a case alleging something as ambiguous as a "contribution to
global warming." Refusal to settle might unnecessarily prolong
litigation, which would result in the company incurring greater legal fees
in defense of the action. 170 Diverting money for legal fees could cause
shareholders to lose money because the corporation would have less
money available to pay dividends. In addition to shrinking dividends,
the corporation would also have less money available to repay corporate
debts or engage in strategic acquisitions. This lack of capital might
damage the corporation and serve as a basis for a shareholder derivative
claim.
Moreover, refusal to settle might affect the corporation's sales
because of negative implications associated with global warming.
American consumers, with newfound awareness of global warming
issues, might be less willing to buy products from a company that is in
any way associated with global warming. This refusal to buy would
cause a downturn in profits and reduce the value of the corporate
stock. 171 The sinking value of the company would provide an additional
basis for a shareholder derivative claim.
The downturn in stock prices coupled with shrinking dividends
would likely cause the shareholders to sue demanding accountability for
"loss" incurred as a result of defending the class actions or breaching the
carbon emissions statutes."72  The shareholders would allege that
prolonged defense of the case ultimately harmed the company, and
because of this harm, the directors failed in their duty of care.
173
Additionally, shareholders might even allege that prolonged defense of
such ambiguous claims amounted to corporate waste 174 because a
settlement could have quickly resolved the dispute without a large
expenditure of funds.
The claims of the shareholders would likely trigger the D&O
insurance policy because such claims generally fall within the definition
of loss. As soon as an action alleges a claim for "loss" covered by the
D&O insurance policy, it is the duty of the insurance company to begin




174. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (a
claim for corporate waste arises when a director squanders resources or irrationally gives
away corporate assets).
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advancing defense costs.' 75 Insurance companies are required to advance
defense costs regardless of the likelihood of success on the substantive
claims, 176 and given the difficult problems of proving a breach of the
fiduciary duty of care, success for the plaintiffs is unlikely. 77 However,
this brief example serves to illustrate how directors and officers could
face increased liability due to global warming and the willingness of
courts to allow plaintiffs to proceed with cases alleging global
warming.
178
B. Applying the Circuit Split Identified in General Liability Insurance
to D&O Insurance
While directors and officers face great liability, the insurance
companies that protect them perhaps face a greater problem. Under the
basic structure of the D&O policy, it is the duty of the insurance
company to advance the defense costs associated with the actions.
79
Although plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed in proving a breach of the
duty of care, 80 the insurance companies are the ones advancing the
defense costs, and, ultimately, losing money.181 Although the insurance
company can point to the pollution exclusion in an effort to escape
payment, the issue of whether carbon dioxide is a pollutant is far from
settled.
182
Even though the Supreme Court classified carbon dioxide as a
pollutant subject to EPA regulation, the narrow split within the Court
suggests the outcome might be different if the issue was raised in a
different context, such as with D&O insurance. 183 Given the ambiguity
over statutory language similar to the D&O pollution exclusion in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the question is how a court would interpret the
175. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see
also W. Cas. & Sur. Co., v. Adams County, 534 N.E.2d 1066, 1068.
176. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 354 F. Supp. 2d 455,464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
177. See In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 53 (the difficulty of proving breach of
duty of care is great because business decisions are protected by the business judgment
rule).
178. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal.
2007); Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No 1:05CV436 LTS-RHW, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33123 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2006).
179. See In re WorldCom, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
180. See In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 53.
181. See In re WorldCom, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (insurer must pay defense costs as
soon as attorney's fees are incurred regardless of the final disposition of the case).
182. See Begley, supra note 5, at 20 (noting the impact of the global warming denial
machine and the "scientific uncertainty" that surrounds the subject).
183. See Cole et al., supra note 22.
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exclusion in a case purely about a D&O insurance policy.1 84 Arguably,
the Supreme Court decision resolved the issue of whether carbon dioxide
was a pollutant, but the holding may be limited to the issue of regulation
under the Clean Air Act.' 85 Moreover, the holding might not even be
deemed relevant to interpreting similar language in an insurance
policy. 
186
In fact, a better argument is that courts will rely on interpretations of
general liability insurance exclusions when attempting to define carbon
dioxide as a pollutant in a D&O insurance case. Analysis of a general
liability policy would assume greater importance because general
liability pollution exclusions are in the realm of insurance contracts, as
are D&O policies. Therefore, when the issue arises in the field of D&O
insurance, courts might be more willing to rely on relevant precedent
from their own jurisdiction, while distinguishing Massachusetts v. EPA
on the grounds that it was a case about regulation, rather than contract.
However, relying on general liability insurance cases to determine
whether carbon dioxide is a pollutant would most likely create a similar
circuit split to that discussed supra Section II(C)(2). Some courts might
apply the rationale used in Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil and
conclude that the use of the word "any" truly means all airborne gases
including carbon dioxide.187 In that case, the exclusion would apply, and
the insurer's duty to advance defense costs for global warming litigation
would not be triggered. Other courts might instead rely on Donaldson v.
Urban Land Interests, Incorporated and conclude that the use of the
word "any" is overly broad and therefore ambiguous. 188 This would
mean that insurance companies would be forced to advance defense costs
for all global warming claims.
Even if one jurisdiction determined that carbon dioxide was a
pollutant excluded under the policy, it is unlikely that all other
jurisdictions would uniformly adopt the holding because of the current
split of authority interpreting general liability insurance policies. 189 The
refusal to adopt a uniform holding on whether carbon dioxide is excluded
from coverage would create problems for insurers because D&O
184. See MONTELEONE, supra note 13, at 6 (commenting on how the issue of carbon
dioxide as a pollutant is unresolved in the context of a pollution exclusion).
185. See id.
186. See id.; see also Cole et al., supra note 22.
187. Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997, 1006 (4th Cir. 1998)
(finding that carbon monoxide was a pollutant and therefore the pollution exclusion
applied).
188. See Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 728, 733 (Wis. 1997)
(stating the pollution exclusion was ambiguous as related to carbon dioxide because a
reasonable person would not consider a product of respiration a pollutant).
189. See discussion of circuit split supra Section II(C)(2).
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insurance companies would be left funding litigation over emissions of
carbon dioxide. While funding this litigation, insurers would also be
battling against the directors and officers over whether carbon dioxide
was in fact excluded under the policy as a pollutant.
C. What the Circuit Split Would Mean: Two Options
The potential for a circuit split in the D&O context only exacerbates
the situation seen in the general liability context because, unlike in
general liability cases, D&O insurers do not directly control the
litigation. Although the current ambiguity surrounding airborne
pollutants forced general liability insurance companies to pay in
unforeseen circumstances, the problem with increased costs for the
insurer was ultimately contained because the insurance company actually
defends the insured and retains direct control over the litigation. 190
Retaining control over the litigation is a very important feature in a
general liability policy because the insurer still has the option to settle at
anytime and avoid further costs. In fact, given the potentially high costs
for proving a "global warming case," settlement actually might be
preferable to protracted litigation, which could serve to exhaust insurance
resources.
In contrast to general liability insurers, D&O insurers do not have
the option of simple settlement, so as to avoid further costs of litigation.
Because of the structure of the policies, the defense of the directors and
officers is a decision left to the directors and officers themselves, with
the insurers funding only the defense costs. 191 Although settlement still
might be an option for the directors and officers, it is doubtful that
settlement would be as prevalent because the directors and officers are
free to defend themselves with the insurance company's money. Indeed,
settlement is often associated with admitting fault, which is something
directors and officers will seek to avoid. Access to capital, coupled with
the recent awareness and stigma attached to global warming, means that
directors and officers would actually want to put up a rigorous defense in
order to distance themselves from assertions that their actions
exacerbated or contributed in any way to global warming. In order to
maintain their positive images, as well as their positions in the company,
directors and officers will most likely want to defend the action rather
than settle.
190. The duty to defend is "[t]he obligation of an insurer to provide an insured with a
legal defense against claims of liability, within the terms of the policy." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 544 (8th ed. 2004).
191. See O'LEARY, supra note 15, at 99 (stating current terms of D&O insurance
policies provide for advancement of defense costs rather than a specific duty to defend).
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The desire of the directors and officers to maintain a rigorous
defense ultimately means that D&O insurance companies could be
funding protracted litigation associated with something as nebulous as
global warming. 92 Although the judge in Comer observed the difficulty
in proving a claim related to global warming, 93 the likelihood of success
on the underlying claim would be irrelevant for D&O insurers because
the duty to advance defense costs applies to any allegation that falls
within the terms of the policy. 94 Presumably, much of the defense costs
will be incurred as the directors and officers prepare for trial. 195 Even if
the plaintiffs ultimately failed, D&O insurers would still be left with the
millions of dollars in defense costs needed to prepare and maintain a
successful defense.
1 96
However, because of the difficulty in classifying carbon dioxide as
an airborne pollutant, forcing advancement of defense costs is not a
forgone conclusion.1 97 The circuit split in the general liability context
shows that a universal holding on whether carbon dioxide is a pollutant is
a remote possibility.' 98 However, courts willing to release D&O insurers
from their duty to advance defense costs ultimately leave directors and
officers funding the litigation themselves. Although this decision would
greatly benefit D&O insurers, it might cause the financial ruin of smaller
business entities that do not have the funding to maintain a rigorous
defense. Additionally, this result might serve to exacerbate the number
of global warming claims because companies paying the defense costs
themselves might be more willing to settle the lawsuit rather than face
the burden of paying huge defense bills. Furthermore, a settlement on a
global warming issue could ruin a company due to the mere stigma
associated with global warming. Shareholders of a corporation might
refuse to be associated with global warming and, therefore, withdraw
from the corporation.
192. See supra Section Ill(A) and Section Ill(B).
193. Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No 1:05CV436 LTS-RHW, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33123, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2006).
194. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 354 F. Supp. 2d 455,464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
see also W. Cas. & Sur. Co., v. Adams County, 534 N.E.2d 1066, 1068 (111. App. Ct.
1989).
195. See In re WorldCom, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
196. See O'LEARY, supra note 15, at xi ("Six, seven, and eight-figure judgments and
settlements are not uncommon," and the costs of derivative actions are continuing to
increase).
197. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 728, 733 (Wis.
1997) (carbon dioxide was a natural product of respiration and not covered by the
pollution exclusion).
198. See cases cited supra note 82.
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D. Understanding Ambiguity: Why Insurers Should Bear the Burden
Although the potential for a circuit split involving interpretation of
carbon dioxide in a D&O policy is great due to the current split in the
general liability insurance context, courts should seek to avoid this result.
A circuit split would create problems for both parties-the insured and
the insurer-because coverage would be determined on a jurisdictional
basis. Assessing coverage on a jurisdictional basis would result in
numerous lawsuits between policyholders and insurance companies over
whether carbon dioxide was covered in a particular jurisdiction.
In an effort to avoid a circuit split and the numerous lawsuits that
would result, courts should seek to create a uniform interpretation on
whether to exclude carbon dioxide from coverage. Courts should
consider the purpose behind D&O insurance when crafting their
decisions. Examining the purpose of D&O insurance is critical because
it could influence judicial determination on whether to advance defense
costs and offers the best way to avoid a potential circuit split. Although
scientists disagree over whether a byproduct of human respiration
(carbon dioxide) can be considered a pollutant,' 99 courts generally hold
that the purpose of D&O insurance is to allow people of all economic
backgrounds to serve on a board of directors.20 0 Forcing directors and
officers to pay for their own defense in global warming cases would
undermine the rationale for having D&O insurance because those unable
to afford the price of a global warming lawsuit would be less likely to
serve on corporate boards. By not forcing insurance companies to fund
the defense costs, the courts would effectively undermine the
justification behind D&O insurance.
In order to uphold the purpose and policy reasons for obtaining
D&O insurance, courts should take the approach outlined in Donaldson
and conclude that the wording of the absolute pollution exclusion is
ambiguous.20 ' This approach would force insurers to advance defense
costs. Although critics might argue that this option runs contrary to the
majority opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA,2 ° z such a decision preserves
the underlying policy reasons for purchasing D&O insurance. In fact,
courts should not even consider whether carbon dioxide is a pollutant.
199. See, e.g., Begley, supra note 5, at 20 (noting the impact of the global warming
denial machine and the "scientific uncertainty" that surrounds the subject).
200. See In re Worldcom, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
201. See Donaldson, 564 N.W.2d at 733 (holding that, as written in the policy terms,
the definition of pollutant was ambiguous).
202. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (carbon dioxide was a pollutant deserving EPA
regulation).
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Instead, courts should focus on the wording of the policy in an effort to
discern ambiguity. This method of interpretation circumvents the
scientific determination of whether carbon dioxide is or is not a pollutant.
Additionally, the current circuit split in general liability insurance
actually demonstrates that reasonable minds are capable of reaching
different determinations on similarly-worded exclusions, and therefore,
supports an argument that the policy is ambiguous.20 3
Furthering public policy is not the only reason to force advancement
of defense costs. In addition to upholding the purpose of D&O
insurance, courts should consider which party is best suited to bear the
burden and pay for the litigation. Ultimately, the burden should be on
the insurance companies to specifically exclude carbon dioxide in the
pollution exclusion if they want to avoid the coverage. As stated earlier,
any ambiguity in the policy is resolved against the insurance company.20 4
This principle is applied because the insurance company writes the
policy and is in the best position to specifically define what is and what
is not covered. If insurance companies want to exclude claims for global
warming, they should specifically state this exclusion in the policies.
Not only would this specifically-worded exclusion resolve any
ambiguity, but it would also give directors and officers notice that the
policy definitely does not cover global warming litigation. This advance
notice might even strengthen the bargaining power of the directors and
officers. If directors and officers believed claims for global warming
might arise, they could demand coverage for global warming litigation.
Moreover, insurance companies are in the best position to protect
themselves against potential claims for global warming. First, insurance
companies can directly exclude claims arising from carbon dioxide or, if
directors and officers are unwilling to allow such an exclusion, the
insurance companies can simply raise premiums. In fact, raising
premiums is probably the best method for insurance companies to
address coverage for global warming litigation. A premium increase
allows insurance companies to collect more money. It also expands the
coverage terms of the policy, which is ultimately better for policyholders.
Higher premiums for increased coverage are economically persuasive
because increased coverage should cost more money. The recognition of
potential liability allows the insurer to better calculate the risks and to
charge accordingly.
203. Compare Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 1047 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1994) (holding that carbon monoxide was a pollutant that fell within the pollution
exclusion), with Reg'l Bank of Col., N.A. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 35 F.3d
494 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding carbon monoxide was not a pollutant covered by the
exclusion).
204. Supra Section II(C)(1).
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Additionally, the insurance company can simply include a forum
selection clause in the policy, whereby the insurance company would
select a jurisdiction adopting a broad formulation of the pollution
exclusion to resolve disputes. 20 5 Although directors and officers might
protest the possibility of litigating in a foreign jurisdiction, the forum
selection clause is the easiest way to ensure D&O insurers are not
covering unanticipated events. Insurers could limit the forum to those
jurisdictions that adopt a broad formulation of the pollution exclusion,
thereby ensuring that the pollution exclusion truly does protect against
"any" pollution in any form.
Furthermore, although little case law exists on the D&O pollution
exclusion, D&O insurers could refer to the case law that interprets the
similarly-worded general liability pollution exclusion. Because the
general liability pollution exclusion has been more heavily litigated,
insurance companies could achieve a more foreseeable result in certain
jurisdictions where courts have interpreted the pollution exclusion in the
general liability insurance context. The forum selection clause would
allow the insurance companies access to better case law, and, perhaps, a
more favorable result.
Finally, D&O insurers retain the option to simply alter the policies.
As discussed earlier in this section, the main difference between the
D&O policy and the general liability policy is that the D&O policy
contains a duty to advance defense costs, which ultimately causes
problems because of the ambiguity surrounding global warming. Should
D&O insurers wish to completely eliminate any risk of paying for global
warming, they could eliminate the duty to advance defense costs and
convert the D&O policies so that they resemble general liability
insurance policies. However, the success of changing the policies is
debatable. There remains the question of what would happen to the
D&O policies currently in force, and whether directors and officers
would be interested in retaining D&O insurance without the
advancement provision.
Regardless of which option the insurance company uses to regulate
coverage of global warming lawsuits, it is ultimately the burden of the
insurer to specifically exclude coverage. Courts need to recognize that
insurance companies have a wide variety of options available and,
therefore, the insurance companies should bear the burden of
restructuring the policy. Insurance companies are in the best position to
predict coverage issues and write the policies accordingly.
205. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 681 (8th ed. 2004) (providing a definition of
forum selection clause).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Protection is the key to any insurance policy. When people pay into
the insurance plan, they hope they never have to use it. However, should
a lawsuit arise, people also expect the insurance company to come to
their defense. The same is true in both general liability insurance and
D&O insurance. Although currently there are no claims against directors
and officers for contribution to global warming, such claims are not as
inconceivable as they once were.206 Both insurance companies, and
directors and officers, must realize that the best time to plan for the
future is before any lawsuit occurs.
However, barring a change in D&O insurance before the initiation
of a global warming lawsuit, courts need to remember that the theory
behind insurance is protection of the insured. Courts should not attempt
to decide a question that has eluded the best scientists-the question of
whether carbon dioxide constituents a pollutant. 20 7 Instead, courts should
focus on the plain language of the insurance policy and analyze the
exclusions while remembering that the fundamental concept of an
insurance policy is protection of the policyholder. If courts remember
the underlying purpose of D&O insurance as well as the principle that
any ambiguity is resolved against the insurance company,20 8 the courts
will reach the eventual conclusion that the insurance company should
advance defense costs. Only by focusing on the purpose of D&O
insurance, without consideration of the scientific question, can courts
avoid a circuit split and place the burden of payment on the correct
party-the insurance company.
206. See MONTELEONE, supra note 13, at 3 (examining current trends and stating how
eventually directors and officers might be linked to global warming).
207. See Begley, supra note 5, at 20.
208. Supra Section II(C)(1).
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